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Abstract 
 
We examine the impact of cross-border mergers on acquirers’ post-merger default risk using a 
sample of 375 US acquiring firms from 1997 to 2011. After controlling for cultural, institutional, 
geographic and managerial factors between the US and target firm countries, we find that on 
average, cross-border transactions decrease the level of default risk of the acquiring firms. Our 
results are consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis that managers take advantage of 
the overvaluation and volatility of their stock prices. We also observe that the geographic distance 
and industrial relatedness play significant roles in affecting post-merger default risk but find 
limited evidence indicating the relevance of institutional environments and cultural factors on 
changes in default risk. We find that option compensation increases the risk-taking motives of 
managers in high risk firms. Another significant finding is that managers use cross-border mergers 
to manage the extant risk of their firms.   
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, with the acceleration of global financial market integration, mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), involving both domestic and cross-border, have been rising steadily. 
International transactions account for a significant portion of the total mergers and acquisition 
deals, reaching to 45% of total merger volume in 2007 (Erel et al., 2012). Moreover, in more 
advanced economies, cross-border mergers accounted for more than 80% of the total foreign direct 
investments (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Cross-border mergers and acquisitions involve 
much more complex issues when compared to domestic M&A transactions, including differences 
in political and economic environments, quality of accounting and information disclosures, 
cultural and corporate governance norms, and bilateral trade relationships between countries.  A 
crucial issue, in this context, is whether cross-border deals result in an increase (or decrease) in 
default risk, post-merger. Therefore, in this paper, we examine the post-merger default risk of a 
sample of US cross-border acquirers.   
 
One of the main reasons purported in the literature for a company undertaking a merger is the 
diversification of its operations that would lead to reduced cash flows variability and consequently 
reduced risk. Mergers and acquisitions indeed have impact on the risk profile of firms, and even 
the possibility of their bankruptcy. While most studies in the M&A literature use accounting or 
equity-based measures of risk, such as z-score or beta, two recent studies employ direct measures 
of risk, namely the default risk. More specifically, Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) use Merton’s 
distance to default model, which combines both accounting and market data, and Furfine and 
Rosen (2011) who use the Expected Default Frequency which is developed by MoodysKMV, a 
commercial data service company. Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) investigate the impact of 
European bank mergers on bidders’ default risk. On average, for a sample of 143 acquiring banks, 
they find no material impact of bank mergers and acquisitions on the level of default risk. 
However, Furfine and Rosen (2011), using a large sample of more than 3600 firms, document 
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domestic mergers in the US, on average, increase default risk of the acquiring firms. The observed 
positive relationship between mergers and the default risk of acquiring firms is in direct contrast to 
the traditionally held conjecture that mergers and acquisitions, through diversification effect, could 
lead to a reduction of risk for the combined firms, e.g., Amihud and Lev (1981). Furfine and 
Rosen (2011) test various hypotheses and contend that their findings are in line with asymmetric 
information hypothesis, i.e., managers of acquiring firms are able to hide risk-increasing takeovers 
from outside shareholders; they further find support for the notion that private benefits by 
managers, due to an increase in the option-based portion of their post takeover compensation, lead 
to higher risk taking by managers of acquiring firms in the US. 
 
While the literature examining various aspects of domestic M&A is ample, there are, by 
comparison, fewer studies that investigate international mergers and acquisitions. The majority of 
studies in the field of M&A deals with the effects of these transactions on stock returns and 
corporate valuation. Briefly, prior studies on cross-border mergers report that acquirers can 
achieve higher valuation by purchasing foreign targets in related industries (Dos Santos, Errunza 
and Miller, 2008) or by acquiring targets in emerging markets or countries that generally have 
weaker corporate governance regime (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005, Bris and Cabolis, 2008 
and Rossi and Volpin, 2004). The opportunity to create value via cross-border mergers can also 
arise from what is termed as “wealth effects”. A stronger domestic currency or higher domestic 
stock market valuation, relative to foreign currencies or foreign stock markets, motivates firms to 
take on cross-border mergers as the price of foreign targets become less expensive (Erel et al., 
2012, Froot and Stein, 1991). Alternatively, transitory valuation errors could also lead to 
international transactions; especially when the stock price of acquiring firms is overvalued. The 
stock misevaluation could encourage these firms to issue shares to acquire (undervalued) targets 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003, Rohdes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004).  
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Although post-merger default risk changes have been examined for domestic mergers, there is 
limited work on cross-border mergers of industrial firms.  Default risk changes following cross-
border mergers have been examined only in the banking sector. There is as yet no comprehensive 
study focussing on industrial firms.  Thus, the objective of our study is to extend the above 
analysis to the case of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. While international mergers and 
acquisitions generally involve complex factors such as foreign political and economic 
considerations, different accounting and information disclosures regimes, and cultural and 
corporate governance issues, at the same time, they could offer multiple advantages such as 
cheaper raw materials and labour costs, enhanced production efficiencies, favorite tax treatments, 
or a combination of these reasons that are not available in the domestic markets. We could 
therefore expect a substantially different relationship between risk and international takeovers than 
that observed in the domestic case by Furfine and Rosen (2011).  
 
We investigate the relationship of default risk, a direct measure of risk, and cross-border mergers 
for a sample of US firms acquiring foreign firms for the period of 1997 to 2012. We find that, in 
contrast to the results obtained by Furfine and Rosen (2011) for domestic mergers, cross-border 
mergers do indeed reduce the overall default risk of acquiring firms which are in line with the 
findings of Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) for cross-border bank mergers and acquisitions. We 
find that geographic distance between the two countries and industry diversification affect default 
risk, and that national cultures play a negative, though marginal role, on default risk. We are 
further able to report that the determinants on the change in the acquirers’ default risk are 
relatively different from those of domestic mergers reported by Furfine and Rosen (2011). For 
instance, we note that the CEO’s compensation is insignificantly related to the change in default 
risk. However, consistent with Furfine and Rosen (2011), we document that idiosyncratic risk, a 
proxy for information asymmetry, is positively related to the default risk. Finally, we report that 
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mergers financed with shares are negatively related to the default risk, albeit not statistically 
significant.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the relevant literature 
and draw testable implications based on theoretical underpinnings. In section 3, we describe our 
data. In section 4, we discuss our methodology for measuring default risk and rationale for the 
selection of variables in our analysis. In section 5, we report and discuss our empirical findings 
and their implications. Our conclusions are offered in the final section.  
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Underpinnings  
The traditionally held view is that mergers result in risk reduction for the combined entity (Galai 
and Masulis, 1974; Amihud and Lev, 1981). This insight is valid when the bidder and target have 
roughly equally risky cash flows and asset diversification resulting in risk reduction. In reality the 
evidence is mixed. Furfine and Rosen (2011) find empirical evidence consistent with the view that 
domestic mergers result in an increase in post-merger default risk.  In the context of bank M&A 
deals in the US, empirical evidence indicates that the post- merger default probability is lower due 
to portfolio diversification (Emmons et al., 2004), geographic diversification (Hughes et al., 1999), 
and activity diversification (Van Lelyveld and Knot, 2009). Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) find 
that on average, cross-border European bank mergers are risk neutral. Mergers and acquisitions, 
especially those which involve cross-border deals, are complex transactions. A host of deal, 
acquirer, and institutional factors influence the post-merger default risk of the combined entity. We 
therefore survey the relevant literature and draw testable implica tions based on underlying theory. 
 
We identify five major sources of post-merger default risk changes. First, there could be a transfer 
of risk from the target firm to the bidder (Furfine and Rosen, 2011; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 
2011). Second, the risk transfer could occur due to the target belonging to an industry that is more 
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risky than the bidder’s industry (Furfine and Rosen, 2011; Maquieira et al., 2011). Third, 
managerial actions could result in a post-merger change in default risk. Extant research has 
uncovered at least four potential actions managers of acquiring firms could take that influence the 
post-merger risk of the combined entity. One of the actions managers could take is to increase the 
post-merger leverage of the combined firm (Ghosh and Jain, 2000; Morellec and Zhadanov, 2008). 
A second possibility is that option-based managerial compensation could potentially incentivize 
managers to take on more risk in the post-merger period (Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; 
Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). There is some evidence in the literature that the composition of 
managerial compensation package could influence takeover decisions (Cai and Vijh, 2007 and 
Harford and Li, 2007). Specifically, managers whose option-based remuneration is high have more 
incentive to engage in risk-increasing takeover activities. Furfine and Rosen (2011) find strong 
support for this notion and report that post-merger default risk increases proportionally to the share 
of acquiring managers’ compensation derived from stock options. A third possibility is that 
managers could exploit potential information asymmetry resulting in increased risk-taking in the 
post-merger period (Moeller, 2007). In those transactions that the level of asymmetric information 
is high, managers are able to get away by undertaking value-destroying takeovers (Moeller et al. 
2007). Furfine and Rosen (2011) find strong impact of idiosyncratic volatility on acquiring firms’ 
default risk. Finally, they could exploit valuation errors when the stock is overvalued (Dong et al., 
2006; Erel et al., 2012). Firms with overvalued stock prices are more prepared to undertake riskier 
acquisitions. Such overvaluation has shown to influence post-merger acquiring firms’ returns (e.g., 
Dong et al., 2006, Shliefer and Vishny, 2003).  A related issue to the misevaluation is the method 
of payment. Normally, managers would choose to pay for a takeover by equity if they believe that 
their stocks are overvalued. On the contrary, it is expected that mergers financed by cash, a signal 
of reduced agency costs, to be value-enhancing transactions (Myers and Majluf, 1984 and Travlos, 
1987).  
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Fourth, deal characteristics such as the use of cash versus could potentially influence the post-
merger risk thereby impacting default risk. In cash financed deals, leverage is typically higher than 
stock financed deals and since leverage is related to default risk, cash deals are expected to result 
in increased default risk.  
 
Finally, there could be cross-border sources of risk arising from a) geographic distance, b) cultural 
differences and c) governance differences between the bidder and target countries. We consider 
geographic distance between the acquirer and target countries to have impact on cross-border 
activities. It is generally accepted that, holding other things equal, the closer the distance between 
the two countries, the more bilateral trade and financial transactions between the two countries. 
Uysal et al. (2008) investigate the impact of geographic proximity on the acquisition decisions of 
US public firms and find that returns to acquiring firms in local transactions are more than twice 
that in non-local transactions. The higher return to local acquiring firms cannot be explained by 
related industry transactions, and appears to be related to information advantages arising from the 
geographic proximity. Erel et al. (2012) also investigate the same issue in a cross-border context, 
and report a role for geographic distance in that the probability of acquiring a firm in a nearby 
country is much higher than that in a remote country. In the context of cross-border deals, we 
expect that the proximity of acquiring and target countries should have an impact on post-merger 
default risk.  
 
Next, it has been shown that cultural norms do influence financial decision making of individuals, 
including cross-border takeovers. Frijns et al. (2013) show that there is a direct link between 
cultural norms and corporate takeover activities and that firms from high uncertainty avoiding 
countries engage less in cross border mergers. Similarly, Ahern et al. (2012) examine the role of 
national cultural values on the pattern of cross-border merger activity and the potential gains they 
create. They report a strong negative relationship between cultural distance and the volume of 
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cross-border merger activity between two countries. Particularly, the greater is the cross-country 
difference between the values of trust, hierarchy and individualism, the smaller is the cross-border 
merger volume. Erel et al. (2012) however, report marginal impact of culture as a determinant of 
cross border mergers. Overall, these works are consistent with the view that higher level of cultural 
differences may impose costly frictions on firms leading to fewer mergers.  In the context of cross-
border mergers, we expect cultural variables such as uncertainty avoidance to have an impact on 
post-merger default risk.  
 
Prior research also provide clear indication that the differences between bidders’ and targets’ 
corporate governance aspects, legal and institutional environments, and the level of financial 
market development where the two firms are located are important features that could affect post-
merger performance (see, e.g., Rossi and Volpin, 2004, Martynova and Renneboog, 2008a,b,  
Burns et al., 2007, Bris and Cabolis, 2008 and Francis et al., 2008 ). The results based on the 
extant literature generally support the view that national corporate governance regulation has a 
significant impact on cross-border takeovers. In particular, firms from countries with weak 
corporate governance regulation are more likely to carry out take-over abroad rather than 
domestically. Firms located in the countries with strong corporate governance regime, especially 
in the form of high minority shareholder protection, are more likely to acquire firms abroad. 
Similarly, strong creditor protection in the home country has shown to have a positive effect on 
international takeover activities. In the context of post-merger default risk, we expect differences 
in institutional quality to have a bearing with a transfer of risk from low institutional quality 
countries to the acquirers.  
We use these insights from prior work to motivate our empirical tests.  
 
3. Data and Measurement  
3.1. Data Sources  
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We collect cross-border mergers data from Zephyr as well as Security Data Corporation (SDC) 
Mergers and Corporate Transaction databases. Following Furfine and Rosen (2011), we select 
only complete deals with minimum ownership of 90%, cash and shares acquisition and mergers in 
non-financial and non-utility industries for the period from 1997 to 2011. We obtain the 
announcement dates, types of payment and industry of acquirers and target firms. Firm financial 
data are obtained from Osiris database and stock return data are collected from Datastream. We 
use data from Osiris and Datastream to construct proxies for idiosyncratic risk (VOL), valuation 
errors (RUNM and M/B ratio), leverage (LEV) and market value (MKTVAL). We obtain data on 
country level governance and accounting standards including the revised antidirector index 
(ANTIDIR), country of origin (ORIGIN), time to collect bounced checks (CHECK), stock market 
development (STOCKMKTDEV), prospectus disclosure index (DISC), periodic filling index 
(DISCFIL) and enforcement index (ENFORCE) from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez De Silanes and 
Shleifer (2008). We acquire data on national culture (UAI) from Hofstede’s website. Following 
Erel et al. (2012), we calculate the distance between capital cities of a country pair (GEO) from 
mapsofworld.com. After merging these samples and dropping the missing observations, we 
winsorise all the independent variables at the 1% and 99% level of their values to mitigate the 
effects of outliers. Our final sample consists of 375 firm year observations.  
 
3.2. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows the overview of the cross-border merger sample by the year and geographic 
distribution. From Panel A, it can be observed that the total deal value has increased drastically 
over the sample period, from US$ 3,779 million in 1997 to more than US$ 27,687 million in 2011, 
with some variations in between. The average deal value per year shows less variation, with 1999 
being an exception which is a result of one major transaction by Wal-Mart Stores Inc.. In Panel B, 
we can observe the geographical distribution of mergers deals over the sample period. Generally 
9 
 
speaking, the number of mergers increases continuously over years from 1997 to 2011, with a 
slight drop in 2008 which could be due to the effects of the global financial crisis. The majority of 
overseas target companies, 107 transactions, just under 30 percent of the target firms, are located 
in the UK, followed by 60 target firms in Canada.  
 
Please insert table 1 here 
 
4.0 Methodology 
4.1. Default Risk  
 
There are various measures of default risk based on academic and commercial models. There is 
evidence that using different measures would lead to different results when investigating the 
impact of the default risk on returns. Many of commercially provided measures have recently 
come under criticism for not being able to predict the default risk of firms during the recent 
financial crisis.  In a recent paper, Chen and Hill (2013) compare various measures of default risk 
from both academic as well as those provided by the leading credit-rating agencies such as 
Standard and Poor and Moody’s. While the authors find the average correlation among these 
measures to be about less than 50%, they report that the relationship between default risk and stock 
returns appears to provide consistent results. They conclude that there is no evidence that 
differences in the conclusions of existing empirical studies on the relationship between stock 
returns and default risk can be attributed to the different models of default risk used. In this paper, 
due to rather exuberant costs of credit-rating agencies charging for their default risk measures, we 
rely on a traditional academic model of the distance to default, namely the original model of 
Merton (1974) and its extension. 
 
Moreover, using the naïve version of the Merton (1974) Distance to Default (henceforth DD) 
model, Bharath and Shumway (2008) report that their DD model is superior to hazard models and 
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in out of sample forecasts than the other existing models. Thus, we follow Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) in measuring probability of default risk1. 
 
According to Merton (1974) bond pricing model, the market value of a firm’s assets follows a 
Brownian motion: 
        VdWVdtdV v                                                                                                             (1) 
where V is the firm’s asset value,  is the expected continuously compounded return on V, v is 
the volatility of firm value and dW is a standard Wiener process. The market value of equity, E, is: 
            )()( 21 dFedVE
rT                                                                                                        (2) 
where F is the face value of the firm’s debt, r is the risk free rate and N is the cumulative density 
function of the standard normal distribution, d1 is given by: 
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where T is one year, and d2 is Td v1  
The volatility of the firm and its equity: 
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The distance to default is calculated as: 
          
T
TFV
DD
v
v

 )5.0()/ln( 2
                                                                                             (5) 
and the implied probability of default is: 
          )( DD                                                                                                                          (6) 
 
                                                 
1 See Bharath and Shumway (2008) for detailed explanation of their model. 
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Next, we measure F as total current liabilities plus one half of long term debt (Bharath and 
Shumway, 2008 and Vassalou and Xing, 2004). E is the market capital of the firm’s equity. The 
volatility of each firm’s debt is estimated as: 
 
v = (E/(E+F)E + F/(E+F)D)                                                                                             (7)  
   
where D is 0.05 + 0.25E and E is the annualized percent standard deviation of returns, estimated 
from thirteen months to one month prior to the merger announcement. Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) use the firm’s stock return over the previous year (rit-1) as the proxy for the expected return 
on the firm’s assets (). Thus, the distance to default is estimated as: 
         
T
TrFFE
DD
v
vit

 )5.0(]/)ln[( 21                                                                                    (8)  
and that the probability of default is:                               
          )( DD                                                                                                                          (9) 
      
4.2. Description of Variables: 
 
We use a number variables in our analysis based on the M&A literature, previewed in the prior 
section that could potentially have effects on the default risk. Firstly, we discuss a number of the 
firm level factors and deal characteristics including idiosyncratic risk, valuation errors, growth 
opportunities, firm size, types of payment and managerial compensation.  
 
We measure idiosyncratic risk (VOL) as the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of 
the acquirer’s stock returns estimated over the six month period ending one month prior to the 
merger announcement. This variable is a proxy for asymmetric information.  
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The next variable (RUNM) is related to valuation errors. This variable is measured as the buy and 
hold return of the acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the 
merger announcement in excess of the market index, S&P 500, returns over the same period.  
 
To capture the impact of method of payment, we use a dummy variable (SHARES) for mergers 
financed at least partially with stocks. Furfine and Rosen (2011), however, are not able to find 
consistent relationships between default risk and misevaluation and the method of payment. They 
observe that for domestic US acquiring firms, stock acquisitions increase the risk level, but the risk 
increasing mergers are typically undertaken by poor performing acquiring firms.  
 
Listing status of the target company is the next variable that is of interest. Unlisted target firms are 
expected to be more risky than listed firms. We test the risk-transfer effect by using the dummy 
variable PRIVATE to indicate a transaction where the target company is a private one.  
  
 The next variable (RELATED) is chosen to distinguish between the two different merger 
strategies, focused versus diversification. We use a dummy if the acquirer’s industry is the same as 
the target firm’s industry. Although studies such as Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and Lang 
and Stulz (1994) report that diversification strategy generally diminishes acquiring firms’ return, 
we believe that risk transfer could occur if targets are from riskier industries compared to 
acquirers. We would therefore expect that acquiring firms in related industries, a focus strategy, to 
involve less post-merger risk.  
 
Firms’ future growth is measured by Tobin’s q and the market size (MKTVAL) is calculated as 
the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Mostly, it is expected that acquiring firms with 
better future growth, i.e., higher Tobin’s q, to have better performance (Doukas, 1995), thus 
reducing the overall risk of merged companies. As for the size of the acquiring firms, it can be 
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argued that relatively larger firms have more agency issues, as their managers are further separated 
from their shareholders, allowing them to engage in transactions that benefit themselves rather 
than their shareholders by way of, for example, overpaying for targets (Roll, 1986 and Moeller et 
al., 2004) and hence increasing the risk facing merged firms. 
 
Takeovers undertaken by firms with higher level of debt in their capital structure are more likely to 
involve higher default risk. We measure the level of leverage of acquiring firms, denoted by LEV, 
and investigate if firms with higher leverage face higher default risk.  
 
We further investigate the role of compensation of managers of acquiring firm and its possible 
impact on the level of risk taking. We denote the option component of managerial compensation as 
OPTIONS and would expect that this variable to have a positive relation with the risk level in our 
analysis as well. 
 
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) report that pre-merger default risk is related to changes in post-
merger default risk. They find that firms with high (low) pre-merger default risk, leading to 
mergers having less (more) post-merger default risk. Thus, we include a dummy variable (HR) for 
those acquirers with high (above median) pre-merger default risk. 
 
We next examine the factors that could have special bearing on determinants of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. These include geographic distance between the acquiring and target 
firms, cultural factors, the quality of accounting and information disclosure, corporate governance 
and bilateral trade relationship between two countries. We would thus expect that the proximity of 
acquiring and target countries, denoted as GEO, would facilitate acquisition of targets and result in 
lower post-merger default risk.  
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We use the uncertainty avoidance score (UAI) from Hofstede (1980, 2001) as our proxy for 
national cultural value. This variable reflects the differences in how firms organize, operate and 
manage in different country origins (Kogut and Singh, 1988, provide details on construction of this 
variable).2  
 
There are a wide range of variables that have been used as proxies for quality of corporate 
governance and stock market development. We control for country-level corporate governance 
mechanisms using a battery of variables, including the revised antidirector index (ANTIDIR), 
legal origin (ORIGIN), ownership concentration (OWN), stock market capitalization to GDP 
(STOCKMKTDEV) ratio, law enforcement index (ENFORCE), and accounting standards, such as 
the time to collect bounced checks (CHECK), prospectus disclosure index (DISC) and periodic 
filing index (DISCFIL). 
 
We provide descriptive statistics of the sample in Table 2. We can observe that the majority of 
target companies are private companies. The median geographic distance between headquarters of 
US acquirers and targets is approximately 3,800 miles. The mean market value of the acquiring 
firms, US$ 18,209,133, is far larger than their median value, US$ 2,641,302, suggesting that the 
larger firms at the high end of distribution are more active in overseas takeovers. Most mergers are 
conducted through cash transactions and are in related industries. Targets countries typically have 
higher uncertainty avoidance scores. The fraction of CEO’s compensation of the acquirers that is 
                                                 
2 Hofstede (2001) states that ‘uncertainty avoiding cultures shun ambiguous situations. People in such cultures lo ok 
for structure in their organizations, institutions and relationships, which makes events clearly interpretable and 
predictable’. He constructed the uncertainty avoidance score using three specific survey questions.  These are:  
1. How often do you feel nervous or tense (at work)? (1. Always to 5. Never). 
2. How long do you think you will continue working for this company (or organization)? (1. Two year to 5. Until 
retirement).  
3. Company rules should not be broken – even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s best interest. (1. 
Strongly agree to 5. Strongly disagree). 
These questions basically capture three features of uncertainty avoidance which are rule orientation, employment 
stability and stress. Responses from these questions are combined in to one single measure of uncertainty avoidance.  
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derived from executive stock options is relatively low, on average (median) around 22% (14%) 
compared to that in domestic mergers (Furfine and Rosen, 2011). Targets countries are generally 
have higher antidirector index values than US, from similar legal origin as the US and typically it 
takes longer to collect bounced checks in target countries than the US. In general, the US has a 
better developed stock market and has higher disclosure indices than those of target countries.  
 
Please insert Table 2 here 
 
Our main model is based on the following regression model: 
PHIt = α + βRUNMt + βVOLt + βQt + βLEVt + βSHARESt + βLNGEOt + βLNMKTVALt  
+ βRELATEDt  + βDUAIt + βHRt + βEXSAMPLEt + βOPTIONSt+βDANTIDIRt + 
βDORIGINt  + βDCHECKt + βDSTOCKMKTDEVt + βDDISCt + βDDISCFILt + 
βDENFORCEt  + Industry dummy + Year dummy + εt        
 
 
where: 
 
PHI:   is the change in the probability of default calculated before and after merger.  
 
 
PRIVATE: is a dummy variable for private target companies. 
 
 
RUNM:  is the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month 
prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return over the same 
period.  
 
VOL: is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return.  
 
Q:   is Tobin’s q.  
LEV:    is leverage ratio.  
SHARES:  is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least partially with stock.  
LNGEO:  is the natural logarithm of the distance between the acquirer’s country and target’s country.  
 
LNMKTVAL: is the natural logarithm of the market value of the acquiring firm at the end of the month prior to 
merger announcement.  
 
RELATED: is a dummy variable if the target’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s industry.  
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DUAI: is a dummy variable if the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index which is a 
Hofstede’s culture variable, of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s 
country, else zero.  
  
HR: is a dummy variable for observations with above median pre-merger default risk, else zero.  
 
EXSAMPLE: is a dummy variable if we have information on an acquirer’s compensation in our database in the 
announcement year.  
 
OPTIONS:  is the fraction of the CEO’s compensation that is derived from executive stock options.   
 
DANTIDIR:  is the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country.  
  
DORIGIN:  is the difference between the code for country origin of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s 
country.   
 
DCHECK:  is the difference between the time to collect bounced checks in the acquirer’s country and that of the 
target’s country.    
 
DSTOCKMKTDEV:  is the difference between stock market development index of the acquirer’s country and 
that of the target’s country.   
 
DDISC: is the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer’s country and that of the 
target’s country.  
 
DDISCFIL: is the difference between disclosure in periodic filling index of the acquirer’s country and that of the 
target’s country.   
 
DENFORCE:  is the difference between public enforcement index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s 
country.    
 
In our regression analysis, we include industry and year fixed effects. 
 
 
5. Empirical Results  
International mergers and acquisitions could provide various avenues for creating synergies and 
improved efficiencies for the firms. To what extent these transactions would lead to changes in the 
risk profile of the firms involved is the question we attempt to answer empirically in this section. 
Specifically, we are interested to examine the overall default risk consequences of the US 
acquiring firms as well as the impact of specific features of these deals on default risks. We first 
calculate the probability of default before and after the merger announcement and we obtain a 
value of -0.009. Thus, we find for our sample of acquiring firms in the period of 1997 to 2011 that 
on average their default risk decreases after cross-border mergers. This result is inconsistent with 
Furfine and Rosen (2011) but consistent with Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011).  
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5.1. Subsample Results 
Next, we report in Table 3 the changes in default risk of our acquiring firms sample based on 
simple binary classification of several characteristics of firms, deals and countries in our sample.  
 
Although there is no significant difference between the default risks of the samples of companies 
taking over listed and unlisted target companies, we observe a significant negative impact on 
default risk when the target company is a listed one. While the literature reports that takeover of 
private companies produces high valuation for acquiring companies (e.g., Conn et al., 2005), based 
on our univariate analysis, it appears that taking over an international listed company with readily 
available market data to be of less risk for the US acquiring firms. Thus there is weak evidence in 
support of a risk-transfer effect.  
 
 According to the finance and law literature, common law countries have the highest investor 
protections, better corporate governance, and more developed capital markets than those of non-
common law countries (La Porta et al., 1997) and have better credit rating (Butler and Fauver, 
2006) suggesting that firms in these countries are relatively easier to raise external financing. 
Fauver et al. (2003) however, report that cross border mergers involving developed countries have 
limited value than those of less developed markets. When we sort our sample based on these 
country characteristics, the results suggest that mergers involving target firms from common law 
and developed countries reduce acquirers’ default risk. As the majority of our target firms were 
located in the UK, we also split the sample to those target companies based in the UK and the rest 
of the world. The results show statistically significant difference between the two sub samples. We 
observe firms taking over UK target firms generally reduce their overall default risk. Thus it 
appears that post-merger default risk is influenced by differences in institutional quality between 
acquiring and target countries.  
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Next, we observe that there is no significant difference between focused and diversified type of 
mergers. However, our results strongly indicate that when the US acquiring firms take over foreign 
target firms in related industries, they can significantly reduce their overall default risk. As for the 
method of payment, cash versus stock, there is again no difference between the two sub-samples 
but the payment of cash does reduce the default risk substantially for this subsample.  
 
Of particular interest in this table is the variable PHI-1, the probability of default before the merger 
announcements. Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) report that pre-merger default risk is related to 
changes in post-merger default risk. For our sample, it can be seen that for low pre-merger default 
risk acquirers, i.e., those below pre-merger median default risk, post-merger default risk increases 
significantly, while for pre-merger high risk acquirers, post-merger default risk significantly 
decreases. This finding is consistent with Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) in the bank industry 
that high (low) pre-merger default risk acquirers do (not) benefit from the mergers.  
 
As for the rest of variables tested, we do not find any statistically differences between the 
subsamples when divided based on misevaluation, information asymmetry, geographic distance, 
size of the acquiring firm, their growth opportunities or cultural factor. However, when we look at 
each subsample, we observe some significant and interesting results. It can be seen that firms with 
less misevaluation based on their past returns reduce their default risk. This result indicates that 
managers of such companies, with a proper valuation of their equity, involve in risk-reducing 
takeovers. The same is true for companies that face less information asymmetry, as proxied by 
volatility factor (VOL). Furthermore, companies that take over foreign operations that are closer to 
their home country, the US, reduce their overall default risk. Finally, the UAI factor, measuring 
the distance in the cultural values of the US and nations where the target companies are located, 
clearly is associated with lower post-merger default risk. 
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Please insert table 3 here 
 
While these univariate results shed certain light on the relationship between default risk and 
certain characteristics of firms, deals, and countries in our sample, they suffer from potential 
confounding effects of other variables that are not controlled for. We overcome these issues by 
conducting our analysis using the multivariate regression model that was presented in the 
methodology section.   
 
5.2. Full Sample Results 
In order to move to our regression model, we need to check for multicollinearity among our 
variables. In Table 4, we report the correlation coefficients between key variables used in the 
study. Most correlation values, except for country-level governance variables, are small and do not 
pose any problem of multicollinearity. The strong correlations among country-level governance 
variables thus preclude us from using these variables simultaneously in our multiple regressions.   
 
We generate our baseline results by regressing the change in default risk, PHI (the change in 
distance to default probability before and after merger), on our independent variables capturing 
firm specific factors, culture, geographic distance and national institutional quality proxies. The 
results are provided in Table 5 and reveal some interesting findings.  
 
Please insert Table 4 here 
 
We find empirical support for the impact of valuation errors on post-merger default risk. RUNM 
has a positive and statistical significant impact on default risk changes. Consistent with the 
misevaluation hypothesis, firms with poor (good) past stock performance are likely to undertake 
low (high) risky acquisitions. It appears that idiosyncratic risk (VOL) also has a positive and 
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statistical significant impact lending support to the view that managers exploit information 
asymmetry and this has a default risk increasing effect during the post-merger period. The positive 
and significant VOL coefficient is consistent with the notion that low (high) idiosyncratic risk, aka 
asymmetric information, result in mergers that decrease (increase) default risk. We find that deals 
in related industries (RELATED) significantly reduce post-merger default risk in the case of cross-
border mergers. Geographic distance (LNGEO) also has a positive effect on post-merger default 
risk. Mergers financed by stocks (SHARES) are associated with lower default risk but the relation 
is not statistically significant. The difference in culture (DUAI) has limited impact on default risk, 
and firm size (LNMKTVAL) and institutional quality proxies do not seem to have any significant 
effect on post-merger default risk. 
 
Acquirers with high pre-merger default risk (HR) undertake these mergers that reduce their default 
risk. It appears that managers use cross-border deals as a risk management device. When their 
extant risk is high, managers takeover low risk targets in other countries thereby reducing overall 
post-merger default risk. On the other hand, when the firm’s extant risk is low, they seem to prefer 
high risk targets in cross-border takeovers. This evidence is consistent with Vallascas and 
Hagendorff (2011) in the context of cross-border European bank mergers.  
 
Please insert Table 5 here 
 
Furfine and Rosen (2011) report that those CEOs compensated mostly by options tend to 
undertake risk increasing domestic mergers. To examine if this motivation also plays a role in 
cross-border mergers, we include a dummy variable if we have information on an acquirer’s 
compensation in our database in the announcement year (EXSAMPLE) and the fraction of options 
of total CEO’s compensation (OPTIONS) as in their study. The results reported in Table 6  show 
that the signs on the coefficients of EXSAMPLE and OPTIONS are not statistically significant 
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suggesting that managerial compensation may not explain the change in default risk in cross-
border mergers. The negative coefficient on HR suggests that managers of high risk firms 
generally try to reduce their firm risk by undertaking cross border mergers with low risk targets. 
However, the positive coefficient on HR*OPTIONS shows that when they are compensated with 
options, they are likely to increase their firms’ risk by choosing risk-increasing mergers. Thus the 
impact of option-compensation on post-merger default risk is much more nuanced compared to the 
findings of Furfine and Rosen (2011) and Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011).  
 
Please insert Table 6 here 
 
 
In order to explore the impacts of country level institutional quality on post-merger default risk, 
we use dummy variables when targets are from emerging markets (EMERGING), UK or common 
law countries (COMLAW). Table 7 reports the results. None of the dummy variables are 
statistically significant suggesting that country origins do not have significant effects on changes 
in default risk. The signs and significance of the rest of the variables are similar to the previous 
results reported in Table 6.  
 
Please insert Table 7 here 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the impact of cross-border acquisitions on post-merger risk of a sample 
of US acquiring firms. Employing a direct measure of risk, namely the probability of default 
proposed by Bharath band Shumway (2008), we provide evidence that the overall default risk of 
firms in our sample is reduced after international takeovers. Our findings are in contrast to Furfine 
and Rosen (2011) who find domestic mergers in the US increase the overall default risk. When we 
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unpack the impact of potential factors that are expected to have an influence on post-merger 
default risk, we find that valuation errors, information asymmetry, geographic distance and related 
industry all play a role. Our results indicate that stock overvaluation may give incentive to 
managers to undertake risk-increasing mergers. We also find that industry relatedness and 
geographic distance do play significant roles in affecting post-merger default risk. Finally, 
consistent with information asymmetry effects, and consistent with Furfine and Rosen (2011), we 
observe that idiosyncratic risk positively affects changes in default risk. In contrast to Furfine and 
Rosen (2011), we do not find a direct role for option compensation. We find that option 
compensation increases the risk-taking motives of managers in high risk firms. Another significant 
finding is that managers use cross-border mergers to manage the extant risk of their firms.   
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Table 1 
Overview of cross border merger sample 
Panel A. Cross border merger distribution by year  
 
Panel B. Geographic distribution of target firms 
 
*Missing deal value data are replaced with 0. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
  MEAN SD MIN 1Q MEDIAN 3Q MAX 
PRIVATE 0.723 0.448 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
RUNM  0.010 0.082 -0.207 -0.041 0.006 0.057 0.259 
VOL 0.019 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.017 0.023 0.054 
GEO (Miles) 3,667 1,875 458 3,669 3,835 4,175 9,917 
MKTVAL (US$ thousands) 18,209,133 47,559,564 43,825 792,787 2,641,302 9,727,396 277,060,300 
Q 2.422 1.564 0.761 1.391 1.962 2.919 9.165 
SHARES 0.085 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LEV 0.655 0.862 0.000 0.169 0.435 0.780 5.312 
RELATED 0.619 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UAI -7.691 20.117 -48.000 -24.000 -2.000 11.000 23.000 
EXSAMPLE 0.808 0.394 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
OPTIONS 0.213 0.246 -0.060 0.000 0.135 0.357 1.321 
HR 0.499 0.501 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DANTIDIR -0.952 1.002 -2.000 -2.000 -1.000 -0.500 2.000 
DORIGIN 0.483 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DCHECK -1.118 0.700 -2.594 -1.710 -1.048 -0.626 0.325 
DSTOCKMKTDEV 35.534 51.012 -106.818 -15.560 35.960 87.448 125.746 
DDISC  0.321 0.233 0.080 0.170 0.250 0.500 1.000 
DDISCFIL 0.212 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.800 
DENFORCE -0.458 0.445 -1.000 -1.000 -0.500 0.000 0.000 
PRIVATE is a dummy variable for private target companies. RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 
12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) 
return over the same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return. 
GEO is the distance between the acquirer’s country and target’s country. MKTVAL is the market value of the acquiring 
firm in the merger announcement year. Q is Tobin’s q ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least 
partially with stock. LEV is leverage ratio. RELATED is a dummy variable if the target’s industry is the same as the 
acquirer’s industry. UAI is the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the acquirer’s country and that of 
the target’s country. EXSAMPLE is a dummy variable if we have information on an acquirer’s compensation in our 
database in the announcement year. OPTIONS is the fraction of the CEO’s compensation that is derived from executive 
stock options. HR is a dummy variable for observations with above median pre -merger probability of default risk. 
DANTIDIR is the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer’s country and th at of the target’s country. 
DORIGIN is the difference between the code for country origin of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. 
DCHECK is the difference between the time to collect bounced checks in the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s 
country. DSTOCKMKTDEV is the difference between stock market development index of the acquirer’s and that of the 
target’s country. DDISC is the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer’s country and that of the 
target’s country. DDISCFIL is the difference between disclosure in periodic filling index of the acquirer’s country and that 
of the target’s country. DENFORCE is the difference between public enforcement index of the acquirer’s country and that 
of the target’s country. 
29 
 
Table 3 
Changes in probability of default sorted based on subsamples 
Number of Observations PHI t -stat mean t -stat Mean Difference
Type of target
  Private 271 -0.005 0.68 0.61
  Public 104 -0.010** 2.09
  Non UK 268 -0.004 0.78 2.06
  UK 107 -0.021***a 3.21
  Non common law country 181 -0.005 0.75 1.02
  Common law country 194 -0.013** 2.32
  Non emerging country 328 -0.011** 2.39 1.10
  Emerging country 47 0.003 0.25
Type of mergers
  Related mergers 232 -0.015*** 3.08 1.80
  Non related mergers 143 0.001 0.12
Type of payment
  Cash 343 -0.010*** 3.06 0.56
  Shares 32 0.008 0.24
% of the acquiring CEO's compensation derived from executive stock options
  Below Median 187 -0.010 1.39 0.17
  Above median 187 -0.010* 1.82
Pre-merger default risk (PHI-1)
  Below Median 187 0.011*** 4.00 4.97
  Above median 187 -0.029*** 3.84
RUNM
  Below Median 187 -0.015*** 2.93 1.63
  Above median 187 -0.002 0.29
VOL
  Below Median 187 -0.012*** 4.77 0.71
  Above median 187 -0.006 0.76
GEO
  Below Median 187 -0.016*** 3.25 1.73
  Above median 187 -0.002 0.27
MKTVAL
  Below Median 187 -0.013* 1.75 0.99
  Above median 187 -0.005 1.35
Q
  Below Median 187 -0.007 1.02 0.41
  Above median 187 -0.011** 2.49
LEV
  Below Median 187 -0.012* 1.77 0.74
  Above median 187 -0.006 1.22
UAI
  Below Median 187 -0.005 0.72 1.03
  Above median 187 -0.013*** 2.59  
PHI-1 is the probability to default before the merger announcements. RUNM is the buy and hold return of an 
acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to  the merger announcement in excess 
of the market index (S&P 500) return over the same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the 
idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return. Q is Tobin’s q ratio. LEV is leverage ratio. SHARES 
is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least partially with stock. GEO is the distance between the 
acquirer’s country and target’s country. MKTVAL is the market value of the acquiring firm in the merger 
announcement year. RELATED is a dummy variable if the target ’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s 
industry. UAI is the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the acquirer’s country (US) and 
that of the target’s country. PRIVATE is a dummy variable for private companies. t-stat Mean is t-statistics 
of the mean variable. t-stat Mean Difference is t-statistics on the difference of the mean variable assuming 
unequal variances. 
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
a,b,c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
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Table 4 
Correlation matrix 
 
PRIVATE is a dummy variable for private target companies. RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 mo nths ending at the end of the month 
prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return over the same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component 
of the acquirer’s stock return. GEO is the distance between the acquirer’s country and target’s country. MKTVAL is the market  value of the acquiring firm in the 
merger announcement year. Q is Tobin’s q ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least partially with stock. LEV is leverage ratio. 
RELATED is a dummy variable if the target’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s industry. UAI is the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the 
acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. EXSAMPLE is a dummy variable if we have information on an acquirer’s compensation in our database in the 
announcement year. OPTIONS is the fraction of the CEO’s compensation that is derived from executive stock options. HR is a dummy variable for obs ervations with 
above median pre-merger probability of default risk. DANTIDIR is the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. 
DORIGIN is the difference between the code for country origin of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country.  DCHECK is the difference between the 
time to collect bounced checks in the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DSTOCKMKTDEV is the difference between stock market development 
index of the acquirer’s and that of the target’s country. DDISC is the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s 
country. DDISCFIL is the difference between disclosure in periodic filling index of the acquirer’s country and that of the ta rget’s country. DENFORCE is the 
difference between public enforcement index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country.  
23 
 
Table 5. 
Determinants of change in risk following cross-border mergers:  US acquirers vs. international targets 
PRIVATE -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.673) (0.637) (0.916) (0.871) (0.683) (0.724) (0.769) (0.729) 
RUNM 0.201*** 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.200*** 0.199*** 0.201*** 0.202*** 0.199*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VOL 2.427*** 2.419*** 2.431*** 2.427*** 2.372*** 2.442*** 2.417*** 2.444*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.153) (0.153) (0.174) (0.107) (0.159) (0.148) (0.150) (0.149) 
LEV 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.733) (0.766) (0.685) (0.820) (0.774) (0.725) (0.727) (0.743) 
SHARES -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.482) (0.464) (0.457) (0.401) (0.462) (0.489) (0.481) (0.516) 
GEO 0.011** 0.010** 0.016** 0.016*** 0.010** 0.012** 0.012** 0.013** 
 (0.028) (0.046) (0.012) (0.003) (0.050) (0.047) (0.024) (0.013) 
MKTVAL 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.660) (0.664) (0.633) (0.641) (0.706) (0.633) (0.665) (0.673) 
RELATED -0.016** -0.016** -0.016** -0.017** -0.016** -0.016** -0.015* -0.017** 
 (0.044) (0.047) (0.048) (0.032) (0.044) (0.046) (0.051) (0.036) 
DUAI -0.015* -0.013 -0.025** -0.009 -0.011 -0.017* -0.019* -0.009 
 (0.067) (0.199) (0.028) (0.334) (0.256) (0.075) (0.059) (0.352) 
HR -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DANTIDIR  0.002       
  (0.668)       
DORIGIN   -0.015      
   (0.208)      
DCHECK    -0.016**     
    (0.023)     
DSTOCKMKTDEV    0.000    
     (0.330)    
DDISC      -0.007   
      (0.753)   
DDISCFIL       -0.011  
       (0.528)  
DENFORCE        -0.014 
        (0.234) 
         
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
N 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 
Adj. R-squared 0.2418 0.24 0.2432 0.2512 0.2417 0.2398 0.2405 0.2428 
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Table 5 Continued 
The dependent variable is PHI, defined as the change in distance to default probability. PRIVATE is a dummy  
variable for private target companies. RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acqu irer’s stock in the 12 months ending 
at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return over the 
same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return. Q is Tobin’s 
q ratio. LEV is leverage ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least partially with stock. 
GEO is the natural logarithm of the distance between the acquirer’s country and target’s country. MKTVAL is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of the acquiring firm in the merger announcement year. RELATED is a dummy 
variable if the target’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s industry. DUAI is a dummy variable of one if the 
difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the 
target’s country, else zero. HR is a dummy variable for observations with above median pre -merger probability of 
default risk. DANTIDIR is the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s 
country. DORIGIN is the difference between the code for country origin of the acquirer’s country and that of the 
target’s country. DCHECK is the difference between the time to collect bounced checks in the acq uirer’s country and 
that of the target’s country. DSTOCKMKTDEV is the difference between stock market development index of the 
acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DDISC is the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the 
acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DDISCFIL is the difference between disclosure in periodic filling 
index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DENFORCE is the difference between public 
enforcement index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. p-values are in parentheses.    
*, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 6 
Determinants of change in risk following cross-border mergers including stock options:  US 
acquirers vs. international targets 
PRIVATE -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.769) (0.737) (0.977) (0.948) (0.775) (0.847) (0.892) (0.818) 
RUNM 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.197*** 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.196*** 0.197*** 0.194*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VOL 2.226*** 2.222*** 2.222*** 2.247*** 2.179*** 2.246*** 2.205*** 2.244**** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005* -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.130) (0.132) (0.145) (0.098) (0.134) (0.122) (0.123) (0.127) 
LEV 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.674) (0.704) (0.618) (0.761) (0.710) (0.659) (0.660) (0.683) 
SHARES -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.414) (0.404) (0.390) (0.353) (0.393) (0.423) (0.408) (0.443) 
GEO 0.012** 0.011** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.011** 0.013** 0.014** 0.014*** 
 (0.017) (0.029) (0.007) (0.002) (0.031) (0.025) (0.013) (0.009) 
MKTVAL 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.652) (0.663) (0.627) (0.635) (0.674) (0.611) (0.649) (0.661) 
RELATED -0.016** -0.016** -0.016** -0.017** -0.016** -0.016** -0.015** -0.017** 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.044) (0.031) (0.040) (0.043) (0.048) (0.034) 
DUAI -0.016** -0.014 -0.027** -0.010 -0.012 -0.018** -0.021** -0.011 
 (0.050) (0.156) (0.020) (0.253) (0.201) (0.049) (0.037) (0.275) 
EXSAMPLE -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.017 -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 
 (0.142) (0.152) (0.127) (0.185) (0.139) (0.137) (0.126) (0.148) 
OPTIONS -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.892) (0.882) (0.977) (0.818) (0.870) (0.900) (0.919) (0.896) 
HR -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.060*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HR*OPTIONS 0.061** 0.061** 0.059* 0.058* 0.060* 0.061** 0.061** 0.059* 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.054) (0.059) (0.051) (0.047) (0.048) (0.054) 
DANTIDIR  0.002       
  (0.714)       
DORIGIN   -0.015      
   (0.185)      
DCHECK    -0.014**     
    (0.041)     
DSTOCKMKTDEV     0.000    
     (0.374)    
DDISC      -0.010   
      (0.621)   
DDISCFIL       -0.014  
       (0.413)  
DENFORCE        -0.012 
        (0.282) 
         
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 6 Continued       
Industry Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
N 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 
Adj. R-squared 0.2501 0.2482 0.2518 0.2572 0.2496 0.2484 0.2494 0.2505 
The dependent variable is PHI, defined as the change in distance to default probability. PRIVATE is a dummy 
variable for private target companies. RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months 
ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return 
over the same period. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock 
return. Q is Tobin’s q ratio. LEV is leverage ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at 
least partially with stock. GEO is the natural logarithm of the distance between the acquirer’s country and 
target’s country. MKTVAL is the natural logarithm of the market value of the acquiring firm in the merger 
announcement year. RELATED is a dummy variable if the target’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s 
industry. DUAI is a dummy variable of one if the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the 
acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country, else zero. HR is a dummy variable for 
observations with above median pre-merger probability of default risk. EXSAMPLE is a dummy variable if we 
have information on an acquirer’s compensation in our database in the announcement year . OPTIONS is the 
fraction of the CEO’s compensation that is derived from executive stock options. DANTIDIR is the difference 
between antidirector index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DORIGIN is the difference 
between the code for country origin of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DCHECK is the 
difference between the time to collect bounced checks in the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. 
DSTOCKMKTDEV is the difference between stock market development index of the acquirer’s country and 
that of the target’s country. DDISC is the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the acq uirer’s 
country and that of the target’s country. DDISCFIL is the difference between disclosure in periodic filling index 
of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DENFORCE is the difference between public 
enforcement index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. p-values are in parentheses.    
*, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table 7 
Determinants of change in risk following cross-border mergers-legal system 
dummies:  US acquirers vs. international targets  
EMERGING 0.003     
 (0.823)     
UK   -0.010   
   (0.501)   
COMLAW     0.015 
     (0.185) 
PRIVATE -0.003  -0.003  0.000 
 (0.768)  (0.773)  (0.977) 
RUNM 0.196***  0.195***  0.197*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
VOL 2.212***  2.183***  2.222*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Q -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
 (0.134)  (0.130)  (0.145) 
LEV 0.002  0.002  0.002 
 (0.684)  (0.720)  (0.618) 
SHARES -0.012  -0.012  -0.013 
 (0.412)  (0.420)  (0.390) 
GEO 0.011**  0.011**  0.017*** 
 (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.007) 
MKTVAL 0.001  0.001  0.001 
 (0.661)  (0.704)  (0.627) 
RELATED -0.016**  -0.016**  -0.016** 
 (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.044) 
DUAI -0.016*  -0.009  -0.027** 
 (0.056)  (0.498)  (0.020) 
EXSAMPLE -0.019  -0.019  -0.020 
 (0.143)  (0.149)  (0.127) 
OPTIONS -0.003  -0.003  -0.001 
 (0.889)  (0.888)  (0.977) 
HR -0.061***  -0.061***  -0.061*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
HR*OPTIONS 0.060*  0.061**  0.059* 
 (0.053)  (0.047)  (0.054) 
      
Year Effects Y  Y  Y 
Industry Effects Y  Y  Y 
      
N 375  375  375 
Adj. R-squared 0.248  0.249  0.252 
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Table 7 Continued 
The dependent variable is PHI, defined as the change in distance to default probability. EMERGING is a dummy 
variable if a target nation is an emerging country. UK is a dummy variable if a target nation is the UK. COMLAW 
is a dummy variable if a target nation is a common law country. PRIVATE is a dummy variable for private target 
companies. RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the 
month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return over the same period. 
VOL is the standard deviation of the id iosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return. Q is Tobin’s q ratio. 
LEV is leverage ratio. SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least partially with stock. GEO is 
the natural logarithm of the distance between the acquirer’s count ry and target’s country. MKTVAL is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of the acquiring firm in the merger announcement year. RELATED is a dummy 
variable if the target’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s industry. DUAI is a dummy variable of one  if the 
difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of 
the target’s country, else zero. HR is a dummy variable for observations with above median pre -merger probability 
of default risk. EXSAMPLE is a dummy variable if we have information on an acquirer’s compensation in our 
database in the announcement year. OPTIONS is the fraction of the CEO’s compensation that is derived from 
executive stock options. p-values are in parentheses.    
*, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
